So, let’s see if I understand, the device only destroys the data after it’s connected to a computer.
So an adversary can just not connect it to a computer and extract the data through alternative means (like unsoldering the chip and reading it directly.
The device should be able to destroy itself either from an internal battery or some physical or chemical mechanism.
The P35S needs to be connected to a computer with a USB-C cable, and that button functions as a two-stage sliding switch. Sliding it to the first stage, partially revealing a red warning sign, requires a bit of force. While pushing it to the second stage, which starts the self-destruction, requires even more force.
Once the self-destruction is started it will continue until the drive is blanked and dead, even if it’s disconnected from a computer.
So the drive can’t start wiping itself unless it’s plugged in, but it’ll wipe itself completely even if someone detains you and takes the drive and your computer, as long as you have time to hit the button.
Initially I thought this was silly for the same reasons you did, but consider: if you’re using proper encryption it’s going to be difficult or impossible to decrypt the files on the drive, so the data should be secure even if the drive is stolen, copied, etc.
However, when you’re actively using the drive and have files decrypted, and then you lose physical access to your devices, you have a problem. IIRC that’s how they got Ross Ulbricht’s files - monitored him until he unlocked his laptop in a cafe and then grabbed it (and him). If you’re worried about that specific threat profile it makes a little more sense to have an easily accessible physical DELETE EVERYTHING NOW button that only operates when the drive is running.
Thought honestly I think this is security theater to make upper management feel like James Bond when giving PowerPoint presentations to external stakeholders, and in that case you want to minimize the possibility of accidental data wiping because the chance you’ll need to deliberately wipe the data is almost zero 😆
(And that being said I don’t see anything in the user manual explicitly stating “the delete button only works if the drive is connected to a computer”, and that seems like a VERY IMPORTANT piece of information to share, so I suspect the delete button does work at all times and the article made a mistake. Shrug 😆)
if you’re using proper encryption it’s going to be difficult or impossible to decrypt the files on the drive, so the data should be secure even if the drive is stolen, copied, etc.
Encryption should always be the last line of defence, encryption that is unbreakable today may be trivially broken tomorrow. Which is why I also I still prefer to overwrite drives with random data instead of just trusting the sanitise command (Even though I know that a big chunk of the data stays unoverwritten as part of the drive’s “provisional area”.
(Which raises another issue that “deleting” a luks keyslot or the whole header doesn’t actually warranty it’s deleted, may have just be moved to the provisional area. So if a key somehow is compromised it becomes nessesary to physically destroy the drive.)
However, when you’re actively using the drive and have files decrypted, and then you lose physical access to your devices, you have a problem. IIRC that’s how they got Ross Ulbricht’s files - monitored him until he unlocked his laptop in a cafe and then grabbed it (and him). If you’re worried about that specific threat profile it makes a little more sense to have an easily accessible physical DELETE EVERYTHING NOW button that only operates when the drive is running.
In that case I rather use something that will reboot the computer and shred the ram as it would serve the same purpose with the bonus that contents can’t also be recovered from ram. Something like an usb drive with a string wrapped around the wrist.
Now, in the situation that the keys have leaked somehow, (like recording the keyboard from afar while the user types the passphrase) then the self-erasing hard drive makes a lot more sense, assuming the user has time to trigger the mechanism.
Now the issue is, that overwriting even a fast ssd takes time, so I’m assuming the device works by destroying or erasing a security chip that holds the keys for the main storage, however the data is still there if the adversary cuts the power before overwriting the whole drive. Ofc encrypted, but like I said before, encryption may be broken tomorrow. A physical or chemical solution that grinds or dissolves the chip somehow seems to me a better option, with the bonus that it can be made to work without electricity.
My assumption is that it probably uses the same mechanism that most other SSDs already have where it always saves the data with internal encryption and simply overwrites the encryption key when a wipe is requested.
This same mechanism already allows SSDs to be formatted quickly while still being secure without having to zero out everything, which would cause a lot of additional wear.
The additional complete wiping would just be the cherry on top.
The image you posted seems to disagree with you. There is some sort of “Physical Data Destruction” in phase 2. The article says the switch breaks some chips, but I didn’t get much beyond that. In any case, lets hope the delete-when-plugged-in thing is redundant.
Fatal flaw is it has to be connected to a computer to start the process. If someone truly wants the data they could just disassemble the device before it gets connected if the button has been pressed. They should have found a way to do it with a small onboard battery reserved only for that purpose.
I mean, it could just be a capacitor. It’s easier to fry something than make it delete itself
So it’s a fidget with a slider AND a button?
Two stage slider
Or you could just use an encrypted file system…
If they are willing to torture you for the decryption key, then they are also willing to kill you if you destroy the drive.
What we really need is encryption with a duress password that just shows some harmless files. Maybe have it overwrite the sensitive data if they want to verify size of the drive. Does something like that already exist? I know standard duress password does, but that could go down as destruction of evidence.
TrueCrypt had/has that feature for full-drive encryption. But I don’t think anyone serious uses them anymore due to the current code maintainers having some questionable allegiances.
You can embed encrypted data inside media files like video, image and audio files. Thats your best bet i think. You cant really hide an entire filesystem afaik unless you build a custom storage device with a controller that only physically connects certain sections under specific conditions.
Def not true about the justice system, killing you does not do them any good, they just want good prosecution statistics
My friends kid loves to press the power button on her computer. This looks too tempting. haha
Help, my cat stepped on the button, how do I recover my data?
To prevent accidental and catastrophic presses, the drive’s self-destruct button is designed with a two-stage sliding switch.
Looks like they prevent that.
CATastropic preesses are prevented? Sounds PURRfect.
I’m not sure I trust myself with that functionality.
kinda like the recompute base encryption hash button in sales guy vs web dude
