Album on lemmy.ca, beehaw.org, shit.itjust.works & lemmy.world

  • 0 Posts
  • 94 Comments
Joined 2 years ago
cake
Cake day: June 7th, 2023

help-circle


  • Thanks for rephrasing. The thing is with regulation when there’s a caveat/condition it’s forbidden not just a correctness check. I think the underlying sentiment is correct, a blanket ban on something is surely easier to enforce than a nuanced approach.

    But that’s my whole point since the first post. A blanket ban on securitization just locks away the whole tool when really we should just work to implement effective regulation.

    The real problem is that law and subsequent regulation lags behind innovation. Like AI or crypto would be an example. So back in 2008 there was a lot of lag on securitization as an innovation. Subsequent to the crisis, in 2025 market reg is well established on securitization products and derivatives.


  • It’s not semantics when what you’re saying doesn’t make sense and is contradictory to reality.

    Actually, I am not sure what issue you’re even raising because of how poorly you communicated.

    I thought about not responding at all, tbh, but then thought that it’s clear you think there is a some sort of material difference between regulation and law.

    Checking if the illegal thing has been done is often easier than checking if the regulated thing has been done correctly,

    pointedly incorrect. and thats my point that checking the illegal thing is the same thing as checking the regulated thing. but you assert there is some difference.




  • It’s the opposite. Regulation assumes business will do anything they think they can get away with if it will make a buck. A lack of regulation assumes companies won’t do those things.

    People think “regulators” allowed this to happen, but actually as “regulators” are agencies established by the government that act upon law. At the time of the 2008 financial crash there were limited or few laws (i.e. regulations) on derivatives. It’s law makers that refused to act.

    It seems people are largely unaware of the myriad of regulatory changes that came after 2008 and bernie that applied to derivatives and customer/investor protection in general.

    The same set of factors that created 2008 is no longer applicable as the environment has changed. There will surely be new regulatory weaknesses that need to be addressed




  • Securitization is a tool and only part of why the markets collapsed. The reduction of the problem to securitization fails to recognize the bad loans and ineffective ratings given to collateralized securities, and the hidden tranches not disclosed to investors.

    If your mortgage/loan market isn’t fraudulent then you don’t have underlying assets with impossibly high risk. If the ratings agencies properly rate securities then investors know what the risk is. And if the government regulates the issuance of these securities through prospectuses (which they do now) then investors will know what’s in them.





  • It’s relevant in that it’s entirely misleading. If profits are low they aren’t actually able to just “coast along” making less revenue.

    Crowdstrike posted a GAAP Net Loss of 20 million for 2025. So a 30-50M cost savings is the difference in continuing on at all or not. There’s more to it than that, obviously.

    Your point is (probably) valid once you fix your words which is what I assume you mean by saying it’s not relevant. But, instead of telling people their rebuttal is irrelevant you should try to adjust your own words to convey your message more accurately.

    The quarterly profit motive where CEOs are incentivized through bonus structures to focus on short term profit goals leads to situations where the companies product or service is substandard and they make bad long term decisions that affect the lives of many including their own employees when they over hire and then can no longer afford to pay them.