"We can’t simply wait and assume that a potential Russian attack won't come before 2029," German intelligence chief Martin Jaeger said. "We’re already under fire today."
Also and as somebody else pointed out, if makes sense for him to try and scare European nations so that they refrain from sending as many weapons and ammo to Ukraine because of thinking they might need those to defend themselves from Russia.
So a sabble-rattling discourse and even the recent air-space intrusions by Russian military planes are cheap ways of trying to get the strategical gain of Ukraine receiving fewer weapons from the rest of Europe and even if those things fail he loses nothing from doing them (at this point, he’s hardly going to get in a worst situation than he already put himself in).
It makes absolute sense to pursue a strategy where at best you gain something and at worst you lose nothing.
Now, if the response to the Russian intrusion in European airspace had been for European nations to set up and enforce a no fly for Russia inside Ukraine, that would’ve definitelly been a loss for him (at the very least the rest of Europe would protect Western Ukraine from Russian drones and air assets, freeing Ukranian assets to be used elsewhere), but the leaderships of European nations have yet to show a willingness or capability to act decisivelly like that as a group: even the help with weapons and ammo took ages to get going properly, was riddled with “red lines” (like “no tanks”, then “no jets”, then “no long range cruise missiles” and who could forget the whole “can’t be used against Russian territory” artificial limitation) and there was a lot of feet-dragging, especially from Germany) so actual direct intervention even if only with air assets doesn’t seem likely as response to “mere” Russian air space intrusions and unconventional warfare that can be denied (cyber attacks, election interference, support for extreme political forces, cutting of undersea cables and so on).
Also and as somebody else pointed out, if makes sense for him to try and scare European nations so that they refrain from sending as many weapons and ammo to Ukraine because of thinking they might need those to defend themselves from Russia.
So a sabble-rattling discourse and even the recent air-space intrusions by Russian military planes are cheap ways of trying to get the strategical gain of Ukraine receiving fewer weapons from the rest of Europe and even if those things fail he loses nothing from doing them (at this point, he’s hardly going to get in a worst situation than he already put himself in).
It makes absolute sense to pursue a strategy where at best you gain something and at worst you lose nothing.
Now, if the response to the Russian intrusion in European airspace had been for European nations to set up and enforce a no fly for Russia inside Ukraine, that would’ve definitelly been a loss for him (at the very least the rest of Europe would protect Western Ukraine from Russian drones and air assets, freeing Ukranian assets to be used elsewhere), but the leaderships of European nations have yet to show a willingness or capability to act decisivelly like that as a group: even the help with weapons and ammo took ages to get going properly, was riddled with “red lines” (like “no tanks”, then “no jets”, then “no long range cruise missiles” and who could forget the whole “can’t be used against Russian territory” artificial limitation) and there was a lot of feet-dragging, especially from Germany) so actual direct intervention even if only with air assets doesn’t seem likely as response to “mere” Russian air space intrusions and unconventional warfare that can be denied (cyber attacks, election interference, support for extreme political forces, cutting of undersea cables and so on).